b'42 SEA INFO TECHNOLOGYThe airport scrambled to supply flight information while digital systems were down. Warren describes the scene thatit became very clear that they werea workers infected laptop, and from followed as something out of a televisionbeginning to add more bodies and seatsthere proceeded to compromise the drama, with colleagues bellowing, Ito outnumber us, she recalls. Theyoperational technology. need this! and issuing urgent ordershad people sitting at keyboards activelyIn retrospect, it appears the to head off attackers who were latergoing back and forth with us. cybercriminals were patient and nimble. identified as members of Rhysida, aAs the Ports cybersecurity teamDetails gathered suggest that the attack global cybercriminal network. Werealized the attackers werent justwas originally planned for a week later, were trying defensive maneuvers, andautomated bots that could be fendedwhen more Port staff would be away over off easily, it began methodically shuttingthe extended Labor Day weekend. Instead, down systems in a rapid-fire manner.the hackers were rushed into action early That process took less than an hourwhen staff detected their digital presence and was immediately followed by furtheron Aug. 23. triage assessments and alerts to PortWithout that pivotal catch, theOPTIMIZED SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS FOR AIRPORTS leadership. But from that point forward,situation could have been much, much no data could move in or get out toworse for SEA and its users.staff, tenants or customers. The Ports We saw partial execution of the GateKeeper App-139 local network and auxiliary data centerencryption, Breed explains. They \x1f\x1e\x1d\x1c\x1b\x1a\x1d\x19\x18\x1a\x17\x17\x18\x16\x15\x14\x13\x19\x12\x1d\x11\x1c\x15\x14\x18\x1a\x15\x10\x18\x0f\x1c\x0e\x18\x0c\x0e\x10\x19\x0e\x14\x0b located across the state near Spokaneshould have shut our servers down and \x1f\x1f\x18\x16\x15\x14\x13\x19\x12\x1d\x11\x1c\x15\x18\x1c\x1b\x13\x17\x11\x1a\x15\x12\x19\x0b were effectively transformed fromencrypted them right away. They didnt \x18\x08\x07\x08\x18\x1a\x15\x10\x18\x1d\x0e\x1a\x11\x15\x11\x15\x06\x18\x1b\x1c\x10\x1e\x17\x19\x0b two-way communication pathways into do that.digital islands, Warren notes.Fortunately, the attacks effects were The Ports overall information GateKeeper TNC-Ops technology network relies on twoalso limited in several important facets, \x1c\x1b\x13\x17\x11\x1a\x15\x12\x19\x18\x19\x15\x05\x1c\x0e\x12\x19\x1b\x19\x15\x1d\x0b most notably safety and security. Federal \x04\x1a\x17\x11\x10\x1a\x1d\x19\x18\x1b\x1c\x15\x1d\x03\x17\x02\x18\x01\x7f\x18\x0e\x19\x19\x15\x1e\x19\x0b common systems: operationalagencies such as the TSA, FAA and U.S. \x7f\x1c\x18\x05\x19\x1a\x1d\x1e\x0e\x11\x15\x06\x18\x1a\x12\x12\x19\x14\x14\x18\x12\x1c\x15\x1d\x0e\x1c\x17\x18\x11\x1a\x18\x18 technology, which monitors and controlsCustoms and Border Protection were \x12\x1a\x1b\x19\x0e\x1a\x14\x0b automated devices, processes and unscathed because each maintains its infrastructure; and enterprise software,own proprietary systems at SEA.which supports primary business GateKeeper CVMS processes such as email, file sharingThe airports larger airlinesincluding \x17\x19\x11\x17\x19\x18\x18\x1a\x1c\x0e\x10\x1a\x17\x19\x18\x1c\x1d\x03\x19\x14\x03\x19\x17\x05\x18\x14\x1c\x1a\x0e\x19\x0b and other user-focused functions. AnAlaska and Delta, which together \x08\x1d\x0e\x19\x1a\x1b\x17\x11\x15\x19\x18\x1a\x10\x1b\x11\x15\x11\x14\x1d\x0e\x1a\x1d\x11\x19\x18\x1c\x13\x19\x0e\x1a\x1d\x11\x1c\x15\x14\x0b\x18 after-incident investigation revealed thataccounted for 76% of SEA passenger \x04\x11\x0e\x1d\x1e\x1a\x17\x18\x1e\x19\x1e\x19\x11\x15\x06\x18\x11\x1d\x03\x18\x1a\x1d\x19\x19\x19\x13\x19\x0e\x18\x19\x11\x14\x13\x1a\x1d\x12\x03\x0b Rhysida hackers penetrated the Portsvolume in 2024were likewise less 651-365-0700www.gksys.com enterprise network months earlier viaaffected. They continued operating in a January | February 2026AirportImprovement.com'